The Nobel Peace Prize of Nihon Hidankyo and the Hypocrisy
of the Japanese Liberal Democratic Party
Oh Eunjeong
Professor of Cultural Anthropology
Kangwon National University
The Norwegian Nobel Committee has decided to award the 2024 Nobel Peace Prize to Nihon Hidankyo, the Japan Confederation of A- and H-Bomb Sufferers Organizations. Some have argued that the selection of the laureate should have been postponed, given the ongoing wars in Ukraine and Palestine. However, the awarding of the Peace Prize to Hidankyo takes on added significance in today’s increasingly perilous global context surrounding nuclear weapons—where nuclear-weapon states are modernizing and advancing their arsenals while non-nuclear-weapon states are pursuing the acquisition of nuclear weapons and the prospect of using nuclear weapons in conflict is being openly debated.
Individuals and organizations engaged in non-proliferation and disarmament have been recognized with the Nobel Peace Prize on several occasions. For instance, former US President Obama received the prize in 2009 despite having taken office only two weeks before the nomination deadline. Although he had made no concrete achievements in nuclear non-proliferation at the time, he was awarded for the vision of nuclear disarmament he championed during his presidential campaign. Similarly, in 1974, Japanese Prime Minister Eisaku Satō was awarded the prize for his declaration of the Three Non-Nuclear Principles in 1967, which prohibited the development, possession, and introduction of nuclear weapons in Japan. In 2017, the International Campaign to Abolish Nuclear Weapons (ICAN), supported by various anti-nuclear groups, including Nihon Hidankyo, was recognized for its leadership in securing the United Nations’ adoption of the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW). Given this history, one could argue that awarding the Peace Prize to a survivor organization dedicated to anti-nuclear peace—especially just one year before the 80th anniversary of the atomic bombings—was long overdue.
Hidankyo is one of several survivor organizations established in 1956 by individuals exposed to the atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki in August 1945. However, it was not until a decade after Japan’s defeat that these survivors gained widespread societal attention, sparked by the death of a Japanese fisherman from a US hydrogen bomb test at Bikini Atoll in 1954, which brought the issue to the forefront. Throughout the US occupation, news reports on the atomic bombings were censored, and, with many other war victims to address, the Japanese society largely overlooked the suffering of atomic bomb survivors. Yet, as awareness grew about the dangers of radiation exposure, a nationwide anti-nuclear peace movement began to spread. Fearing that the growing anti-nuclear movement might fuel anti-American sentiments, the US promptly negotiated compensation with the affected fishermen. Even the Japanese government, which had long been apathetic toward atomic bomb survivors, began providing medical and welfare assistance, officially recognizing them by coining the term ‘hibakusha’ (surviving victims of the atomic bombs). Hidankyo indeed faced criticism for failing to act in solidarity with Korean atomic bomb survivors—who had been challenging the Japanese government since the 1970s—and for focusing primarily on victimhood while neglecting the broader historical context of Japan’s actions during the Asia-Pacific War and colonial exploitation. However, the message of anti-nuclear peace, expressed by those who directly experienced the horrors of the atomic bombings, resonated deeply and powerfully.
Around the time of Hidankyo’s Nobel Peace Prize award, Prime Minister Shigeru Ishiba’s commentary was published by the US-based Hudson Institute, in which he advocated for the establishment of an “Asian NATO” and suggested considering “America’s sharing of nuclear weapons or the introduction of nuclear weapons into the region.” Ishiba argued that Russia’s invasion of Ukraine exposed a fundamental limitation in the United Nations’ collective security regime. He also referenced US President Joe Biden’s remark that, since Ukraine is “not a member of NATO [the North Atlantic Treaty Organization], so there are no obligations to defend it.” Ishiba’s vision for an Asian version of NATO took shape in the presence of neighboring countries like China— which, like Russia, holds a permanent seat on the UN Security Council and possesses strategic nuclear weapons— and its ongoing conflict with Taiwan, along with North Korea’s growing nuclear and long-range missile capabilities, as well as its increasing military cooperation with Russia. Despite widespread criticism of his ideas, Ishiba remained firm in his belief. In the lead-up to the October Lower House election, he emphasized the critical role of nuclear deterrence in preventing wars, using the situation in Ukraine as a cautionary example of what can occur without such deterrence.
His firm stance on defense matters should not be dismissed as just a personal viewpoint, especially given that he is seen as a relatively moderate politician and has opted not to visit the Yasukuni Shrine. Even at the time of Japan’s commitment to the Non-Nuclear Three Principles, there was an implicit agreement between the US and Japan regarding nuclear deterrence, especially concerning Okinawa. This included arrangements for introducing US tactical nuclear weapons or stationing US nuclear-powered aircraft carriers in Okinawa during emergencies—ensuring that Japan remained under the US nuclear umbrella. However, it was not until after the 2011 Great East Japan Earthquake that the issue of amending Japan’s pacifist constitution and nuclear policy came to the forefront of the national political debate when the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) reclaimed power from the Constitutional Democratic Party (CDP), under the banner of a nationalist narrative of post-disaster reconstruction.
In 2014, the Abe administration officially declared its plans to reinterpret the Constitution, permitting the right to collective self-defense. This constitutional amendment enabled the Self-Defense Forces (SDF)—previously limited to using minimal force in response to direct attacks on Japanese territory—to gain the authority to launch counterattacks under certain conditions, including when a nation with close ties to Japan is under attack. The amendment effectively established a framework in which Japan could engage in military action at any time, marking a fundamental break from and erosion of the post-war framework grounded in pacifism. The subsequent Kishida administration further accelerated this shift in 2022 by approving the revision of Japan’s three major security documents: the National Security Strategy, the National Defense Strategy, and the Defense Buildup Plan. This approval included acquiring counterstrike capabilities against enemy missile bases and enhancing long-range missile capabilities. The revision also included plans to increase defense spending from 1% of GDP to 2% by 2027. Though not finalized, the Kishida administration floated the idea of using revenue from the post-disaster reconstruction tax (2.1% of income tax)—levied after the 2011 Great East Japan Earthquake and Fukushima nuclear disaster—to fund these military initiatives.
As Japan, under the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP), races toward becoming a nation capable of engaging in nuclear warfare, it has consistently refused to take any meaningful steps to support the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW) despite growing pressure from organizations like Nihon Hidankyo. Adopted by the United Nations in 2017, the TPNW offers a far more robust framework for nuclear disarmament than the long-established Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), which has often reflected the interests of nuclear-weapon states. The TPNW not only bans the development, testing, production, acquisition, possession, stockpiling, and use of nuclear weapons but also prohibits any threats of nuclear use. Although the treaty officially entered into force in 2021 after gaining over 50 ratifications, nuclear weapon states like the US, China, and Russia, along with NATO members and countries such as Japan and Korea—who rely on US nuclear-extended deterrence—have refused to join. Prime Minister Ishiba has voiced his opposition to endorsing the treaty, suggesting that a nuclear ban could escalate regional tensions. His comments came after he shared his reflection on the emotional impact of watching the footage of Hiroshima’s devastation as a child.
Ishiba’s perspective on Japan’s defense policy is telling—particularly in how it reflects the broader ambition of the LDP to push the country beyond its capacity for a conventional war toward a future where it could engage in nuclear warfare. Paradoxically, this shift is framed in the name of peace while simultaneously consuming the victimhood of atomic bombings as a narrative tool. In this context, it is important to recall the International People’s Tribunal to Hold the US Accountable for Dropping A-bombs: Second Forum, held in Hiroshima this past June. The forum was a precursor to the People’s Tribunal slated for 2026 in New York, co-chaired by Kang Uil, former Bishop of the Catholic Diocese of Jeju, and Takashi Hiraoka, former mayor of Hiroshima. This forum not only addressed the accountability of the US for the atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki under international humanitarian law as of 1945 (i.e., the “Martens Clause,” which prohibits inhumane actions in the absence of specific legal provisions) but also clarified the illegality of the use and threat of nuclear weapons, including nuclear (extended) deterrence—based on International Law established after 1945. In doing so, the forum contributed to the ongoing effort to strengthen the international legal prohibition on nuclear weapons.
Scholars from New Zealand, the US, Germany, Japan, and South Korea and survivor organizations like Hidankyo and peace activists gathered in Hiroshima for the forum. One of the most moving moments was when Shim Jin-tae, head of the Hapcheon branch of the Korean Atomic Bomb Victims Association, passionately shared his mission: “Before I die, it is my duty to let the world know that weapons like these should not exist on Earth.” Mr. Shim, a lifelong farmer, began advocating for accountability from the US following his participation in the 2015 Non-Proliferation Treaty Review Conference as an atomic bomb survivor. This anti-nuclear message of peace, echoed by fellow survivors—including those from Hidankyo—stems from their embodied experiences of destruction. It directly refuses the false narrative of “self-defense” used by the nation-states to justify nuclear militarization, often disguised as peace. With Japan’s government veering further to the right and becoming more corrupt under the LDP, the Nobel Peace Prize awarded to Hidankyo should serve as more than just a rhetorical acknowledgment of the suffering. It should be a wake-up call for urgent and meaningful action.
The Nobel Peace Prize of Nihon Hidankyo and the Hypocrisy
of the Japanese Liberal Democratic Party
Oh Eunjeong
Professor of Cultural Anthropology
Kangwon National University
The Norwegian Nobel Committee has decided to award the 2024 Nobel Peace Prize to Nihon Hidankyo, the Japan Confederation of A- and H-Bomb Sufferers Organizations. Some have argued that the selection of the laureate should have been postponed, given the ongoing wars in Ukraine and Palestine. However, the awarding of the Peace Prize to Hidankyo takes on added significance in today’s increasingly perilous global context surrounding nuclear weapons—where nuclear-weapon states are modernizing and advancing their arsenals while non-nuclear-weapon states are pursuing the acquisition of nuclear weapons and the prospect of using nuclear weapons in conflict is being openly debated.
Individuals and organizations engaged in non-proliferation and disarmament have been recognized with the Nobel Peace Prize on several occasions. For instance, former US President Obama received the prize in 2009 despite having taken office only two weeks before the nomination deadline. Although he had made no concrete achievements in nuclear non-proliferation at the time, he was awarded for the vision of nuclear disarmament he championed during his presidential campaign. Similarly, in 1974, Japanese Prime Minister Eisaku Satō was awarded the prize for his declaration of the Three Non-Nuclear Principles in 1967, which prohibited the development, possession, and introduction of nuclear weapons in Japan. In 2017, the International Campaign to Abolish Nuclear Weapons (ICAN), supported by various anti-nuclear groups, including Nihon Hidankyo, was recognized for its leadership in securing the United Nations’ adoption of the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW). Given this history, one could argue that awarding the Peace Prize to a survivor organization dedicated to anti-nuclear peace—especially just one year before the 80th anniversary of the atomic bombings—was long overdue.
Hidankyo is one of several survivor organizations established in 1956 by individuals exposed to the atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki in August 1945. However, it was not until a decade after Japan’s defeat that these survivors gained widespread societal attention, sparked by the death of a Japanese fisherman from a US hydrogen bomb test at Bikini Atoll in 1954, which brought the issue to the forefront. Throughout the US occupation, news reports on the atomic bombings were censored, and, with many other war victims to address, the Japanese society largely overlooked the suffering of atomic bomb survivors. Yet, as awareness grew about the dangers of radiation exposure, a nationwide anti-nuclear peace movement began to spread. Fearing that the growing anti-nuclear movement might fuel anti-American sentiments, the US promptly negotiated compensation with the affected fishermen. Even the Japanese government, which had long been apathetic toward atomic bomb survivors, began providing medical and welfare assistance, officially recognizing them by coining the term ‘hibakusha’ (surviving victims of the atomic bombs). Hidankyo indeed faced criticism for failing to act in solidarity with Korean atomic bomb survivors—who had been challenging the Japanese government since the 1970s—and for focusing primarily on victimhood while neglecting the broader historical context of Japan’s actions during the Asia-Pacific War and colonial exploitation. However, the message of anti-nuclear peace, expressed by those who directly experienced the horrors of the atomic bombings, resonated deeply and powerfully.
Around the time of Hidankyo’s Nobel Peace Prize award, Prime Minister Shigeru Ishiba’s commentary was published by the US-based Hudson Institute, in which he advocated for the establishment of an “Asian NATO” and suggested considering “America’s sharing of nuclear weapons or the introduction of nuclear weapons into the region.” Ishiba argued that Russia’s invasion of Ukraine exposed a fundamental limitation in the United Nations’ collective security regime. He also referenced US President Joe Biden’s remark that, since Ukraine is “not a member of NATO [the North Atlantic Treaty Organization], so there are no obligations to defend it.” Ishiba’s vision for an Asian version of NATO took shape in the presence of neighboring countries like China— which, like Russia, holds a permanent seat on the UN Security Council and possesses strategic nuclear weapons— and its ongoing conflict with Taiwan, along with North Korea’s growing nuclear and long-range missile capabilities, as well as its increasing military cooperation with Russia. Despite widespread criticism of his ideas, Ishiba remained firm in his belief. In the lead-up to the October Lower House election, he emphasized the critical role of nuclear deterrence in preventing wars, using the situation in Ukraine as a cautionary example of what can occur without such deterrence.
His firm stance on defense matters should not be dismissed as just a personal viewpoint, especially given that he is seen as a relatively moderate politician and has opted not to visit the Yasukuni Shrine. Even at the time of Japan’s commitment to the Non-Nuclear Three Principles, there was an implicit agreement between the US and Japan regarding nuclear deterrence, especially concerning Okinawa. This included arrangements for introducing US tactical nuclear weapons or stationing US nuclear-powered aircraft carriers in Okinawa during emergencies—ensuring that Japan remained under the US nuclear umbrella. However, it was not until after the 2011 Great East Japan Earthquake that the issue of amending Japan’s pacifist constitution and nuclear policy came to the forefront of the national political debate when the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) reclaimed power from the Constitutional Democratic Party (CDP), under the banner of a nationalist narrative of post-disaster reconstruction.
In 2014, the Abe administration officially declared its plans to reinterpret the Constitution, permitting the right to collective self-defense. This constitutional amendment enabled the Self-Defense Forces (SDF)—previously limited to using minimal force in response to direct attacks on Japanese territory—to gain the authority to launch counterattacks under certain conditions, including when a nation with close ties to Japan is under attack. The amendment effectively established a framework in which Japan could engage in military action at any time, marking a fundamental break from and erosion of the post-war framework grounded in pacifism. The subsequent Kishida administration further accelerated this shift in 2022 by approving the revision of Japan’s three major security documents: the National Security Strategy, the National Defense Strategy, and the Defense Buildup Plan. This approval included acquiring counterstrike capabilities against enemy missile bases and enhancing long-range missile capabilities. The revision also included plans to increase defense spending from 1% of GDP to 2% by 2027. Though not finalized, the Kishida administration floated the idea of using revenue from the post-disaster reconstruction tax (2.1% of income tax)—levied after the 2011 Great East Japan Earthquake and Fukushima nuclear disaster—to fund these military initiatives.
As Japan, under the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP), races toward becoming a nation capable of engaging in nuclear warfare, it has consistently refused to take any meaningful steps to support the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW) despite growing pressure from organizations like Nihon Hidankyo. Adopted by the United Nations in 2017, the TPNW offers a far more robust framework for nuclear disarmament than the long-established Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), which has often reflected the interests of nuclear-weapon states. The TPNW not only bans the development, testing, production, acquisition, possession, stockpiling, and use of nuclear weapons but also prohibits any threats of nuclear use. Although the treaty officially entered into force in 2021 after gaining over 50 ratifications, nuclear weapon states like the US, China, and Russia, along with NATO members and countries such as Japan and Korea—who rely on US nuclear-extended deterrence—have refused to join. Prime Minister Ishiba has voiced his opposition to endorsing the treaty, suggesting that a nuclear ban could escalate regional tensions. His comments came after he shared his reflection on the emotional impact of watching the footage of Hiroshima’s devastation as a child.
Ishiba’s perspective on Japan’s defense policy is telling—particularly in how it reflects the broader ambition of the LDP to push the country beyond its capacity for a conventional war toward a future where it could engage in nuclear warfare. Paradoxically, this shift is framed in the name of peace while simultaneously consuming the victimhood of atomic bombings as a narrative tool. In this context, it is important to recall the International People’s Tribunal to Hold the US Accountable for Dropping A-bombs: Second Forum, held in Hiroshima this past June. The forum was a precursor to the People’s Tribunal slated for 2026 in New York, co-chaired by Kang Uil, former Bishop of the Catholic Diocese of Jeju, and Takashi Hiraoka, former mayor of Hiroshima. This forum not only addressed the accountability of the US for the atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki under international humanitarian law as of 1945 (i.e., the “Martens Clause,” which prohibits inhumane actions in the absence of specific legal provisions) but also clarified the illegality of the use and threat of nuclear weapons, including nuclear (extended) deterrence—based on International Law established after 1945. In doing so, the forum contributed to the ongoing effort to strengthen the international legal prohibition on nuclear weapons.
Scholars from New Zealand, the US, Germany, Japan, and South Korea and survivor organizations like Hidankyo and peace activists gathered in Hiroshima for the forum. One of the most moving moments was when Shim Jin-tae, head of the Hapcheon branch of the Korean Atomic Bomb Victims Association, passionately shared his mission: “Before I die, it is my duty to let the world know that weapons like these should not exist on Earth.” Mr. Shim, a lifelong farmer, began advocating for accountability from the US following his participation in the 2015 Non-Proliferation Treaty Review Conference as an atomic bomb survivor. This anti-nuclear message of peace, echoed by fellow survivors—including those from Hidankyo—stems from their embodied experiences of destruction. It directly refuses the false narrative of “self-defense” used by the nation-states to justify nuclear militarization, often disguised as peace. With Japan’s government veering further to the right and becoming more corrupt under the LDP, the Nobel Peace Prize awarded to Hidankyo should serve as more than just a rhetorical acknowledgment of the suffering. It should be a wake-up call for urgent and meaningful action.